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A NEW ERA OF MEDICARE
OVERSIGHT
DANIEL R. LEVINSON*
Medicare constitutes the largest health insurance program in the nation,' and
as the health care landscape changes, so does Medicare. In its early decades,
Medicare focused on "paying the bill" for beneficiaries' hospital and doctor visits.
Starting in the 1970s, the program was run by an agency with a name that reflected
this reimbursement orientation: the Health Care Financing Administration. In the
new millennium, Medicare's administering agency was renamed the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services ("CMS"), 2 reflecting a shift toward broader
engagement in the administration of the health care programs. This shift set the
stage for more dramatic changes in the Medicare program aimed at improving care
and lowering costs through value-driven delivery and payment reforms.
Similar changes have been happening across health care, fueled by
innovations in science and information technology, advances in evidence-based
medicine and quality measurement, and the urgent need to address health care
spending. These changes, and the extraordinary pace at which they are unfolding,
have important implications for Medicare and other Federal health care programs.
Evidence of these changes can be seen in the emergence of integrated and
coordinated models for delivering health care services to patients in both the
public3 and private sectors. 4 The premise of these models is that health care

* Daniel R. Levinson is Inspector General for the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The
views contained herein are the author's alone. The author wishes to express his gratitude to Katherine
Matos, Esq. for her invaluable assistance in the preparation of this essay, which has been adapted from
the Stuart Rome Lecture delivered at the University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law on
March 22, 2012.
1. OFFICE OF RESEARCH, EVALUATION, AND STATISTICS, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT TO THE SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN, 2011 44 (Feb. 2012),
availableat http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/supplement/20 1/supplement 11 .pdf.
2. CMS administers both the Medicare and Medicaid programs. See generally CTRS. FOR
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVs., http://www.cms.gov (last visited June 7, 2012). The principles set forth
in this article are also applicable to the administration of the Medicaid program.
3. For example, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124
Stat. 119 (2011) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.), amended by
Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 [hereinafter
Affordable Care Act], included significant provisions aimed at improving quality and reducing costs in
the Medicare and Medicaid programs through delivery and payment reforms, including, for example,
accountable care organizations, medical homes, bundled payments, value-based purchasing, and various
demonstration programs. See generally Affordable Care Act, Title Ill. See also, e.g., Lyle Nelson,
Lessons from Medicare's Demonstration Projects on Disease Management and Care Coordination3
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providers can achieve improved results in health outcomes and efficiencies at
reduced costs by coordinating patient care across providers, enhancing chronic
disease management, 5 eliminating unnecessary duplication of tests and services,
reducing unnecessary hospital readmissions, adopting electronic health records,
increasing the rate of preventive care and wellness services, promoting patient

(Health & Human Res. Div., Cong. Budget Office, Working Paper 2012-01, 2012) (describing Medicare
demonstration programs); CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., ROADMAP FOR IMPLEMENTING
VALUE DRIVEN HEALTHCARE IN THE TRADITIONAL MEDICARE FEE-FOR-SERVICE PROGRAM 3,
(last
https://www.cms.gov/QualitylnitiativesGenlnfo/downloads/VBPRoadmapOEA 1-16_508.pdf
visited Mar. 30, 2012) (describing various Medicare payment initiatives). States are also developing new
models for the Medicaid program. See, e.g., State Demonstrations, CTRS. MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS., U.S. DEP'T HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVS. (last visited Feb. 9, 2012),
demonstration
(describing
http://innovations.cms.gov/initiatives/State-Demonstrations/index.html
programs in 15 states to better coordinate care for individuals dually eligible for both Medicaid and
Medicare); KITTY PURINGTON ET AL., NAT'L ACAD. FOR STATE HEALTH POL'Y, THE COMMONWEALTH
FUND, ON THE ROAD TO BETTER VALUE: STATE ROLES IN PROMOTING ACCOUNTABLE CARE
14 (2011), available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/medialFiles/
ORGANIZATIONS

Publications/Fund%20Report/201 1/Feb/On%20the%2ORoad%20to%20Better/o2OValue/1479_Puringto
n onthe road to better value ACOsFINAL.pdf (describing various state efforts to promote quality
care and efficiency). As this article goes to press, a decision regarding the constitutionality of the
Affordable Care Act is pending from the Supreme Court of the United States. See generally Patient
Protection and Affordable
Care Act
Cases, SUPREME
COURT
OF THE
U.S.,
(last updated Mar. 26, 2012) (providing
http://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/PPAACA.aspx
information on the six consolidated cases). However, concepts of integration, coordination, and value in
health care payment and delivery, manifested in the Affordable Care Act, preceded the legislation, and it
is posited here that these concepts-and the corresponding need for effective approaches to oversightwill continue to develop in public and private health insurance programs regardless of the outcome of
the Supreme Court's decision.
4. The private sector is increasingly experimenting with accountable care organizations and other
performance based models. See generally, e.g., Robert A. Berenson & Rachel A. Burton, Accountable
Care Organizations in Medicare and the Private Sector: A Status Update, TIMELY ANALYSIS OF
IMMEDIATE HEALTH POL'Y ISSUES (Urban Inst., Washington, D.C.), Nov. 2011, at 3-4 (describing
private sector initiatives); Jonathan Block, Success of Blues Plans' Medical Homes Initiative Prompts
Growth, HEALTH BUS. DAILY (Nov. 7, 2011), http://aishealth.com/archive/nhpwl02411-05 (describing
private insurer medical home projects); Susan DeVore & R. Wesley Champion, Driving Population
Health through Accountable Care Organizations,30 HEALTH AFF. 41, 42 (2011) (describing a private
sector accountable care initiative); Apama Higgins et al., Early Lessons from Accountable Care Models
in the PrivateSector: PartnershipsBetween Health Plans and Providers, 30 HEALTH AFF. 1718, 1718
(2011) (highlighting the development of collaborative health care models in the private sector); Robert
E. Mechanic et al., Medical Group Responses to Global Payment: Early Lessons from the 'Alternative
Quality Contract' in Massachusetts, 30 HEALTH AFF. 1734, 1734 (2011) (describing a private insurer
program in Massachusetts involving global payments and quality bonuses); ARICCA D. VAN CITTERS ET
AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, FOUR HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATIONS' EFFORTS TO IMPROVE
PATIENT CARE AND REDUCE COSTS 1-2 (2012) (case studies of four health systems participating in a
private sector accountable care initiative). Notably, almost all private and employee health insurance
plans offer disease management and care coordination programs. See Nelson, supra note 3, at 2.
5. A relatively small portion of the Medicare population accounts for the majority of Medicare
fee-for-service spending. See, e.g., HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICARE POLICY FACTSHEET:
MEDICARE SPENDING AND FINANCING (2011) (noting that in 2007, ten percent of beneficiaries
accounted for approximately fifty-nine percent of all Medicare fee-for-service spending). Focusing care
improvement activities on addressing the needs and health of the most expensive patient populations
offers the potential for meaningful savings.
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engagement in care, and redesigning care processes to improve quality. Payment
incentives for providers under such models are designed to support the transition to
coordinated care and reward the accomplishment of better care for beneficiaries at
reduced costs. A recent example of this approach is the Medicare Shared Savings
Program ("SSP") established under the Affordable Care Act, which introduced
accountable care organizations ("ACOs") 6 into the Medicare program to manage
and coordinate care for fee-for-service beneficiaries. 7
Oversight of the Medicare program will need to adapt to this changing
dynamic. The Office of Inspector General ("OIG") of the Department of Health and
Human Services ("HHS") seeks to detect and prevent fraud and abuse, as well as
promote the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of HHS programs. 8 This
mission is a responsibility shared with program officials and law enforcement
authorities throughout government. 9 The challenge is to adopt oversight approaches
that are suited to an increasingly complex and sophisticated health care system and
tailored to protect programs and patients from existing and new vulnerabilities. The
government and private sector stakeholders must capitalize on new tools and
capabilities for detecting problems, including better health information technology
that facilitates smarter, timelier data collection and analysis. The scope and
execution of the oversight mission-from prevention efforts to enforcement-must
be adaptable, nimble, and responsive to change. OIG itself is continually focused
on improving internal coordination among multiple disciplines to optimize its
impact and value.' 0
In the context of coordinated care and other value-driven programs, the
oversight mission can be accomplished most effectively through a strategy that
combines five discrete, but connected, areas into an integrated approach to program
protection: program gatekeeping, sound payment, program compliance, effective
monitoring, and government remediation."
6. The term "ACO" is used in this essay to refer specifically to ACOs under the SSP; however,
accountable care organizations, more generally, exist in other settings.
7. Affordable Care Act, § 3022 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(a)(1)). See also
Accountable Care Organizations, OFFICE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
http://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/accountable-care-organizations/index.asp (last visited Mar. 27, 2012).
8. Inspector General Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. app. 3 § 2(1)-(2) (2006). HHS OIG oversees all HHS
programs, including, for example, Medicare, Medicaid, the Public Health Service, and others. See About
Us, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://oig.hhs.gov/aboutoig/about-us/index.asp (last visited Mar. 26, 2012); See generally OIG at HHS, TWITTER,
http://twitter.com/OIGatHHS (last visited Mar. 26, 2012) (providing updates of OIG activities).
9. See 5 U.S.C. app. 3 § 4(4) (2006) (noting that the Inspector General works with "other Federal
agencies, State and local governmental agencies, and nongovernmental entities").
10. Within OIG, the mission is carried out by auditors, evaluators, investigators, attorneys, and
management and support staff. See generally, e.g., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH
& HUMAN SERVS., WORK PLAN: FISCAL YEAR 2012 ii (2012) (describing OIG's components).
11. These principles are not new; they draw on earlier OIG work that identified five principles of an
effective program integrity strategy, including scrutinizing prospective providers prior to their
enrollment in health care programs; establishing payment methodologies that are reasonable and
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I. PROGRAM GATEKEEPING
If providers do not meet the standards of professionalism and financial
trustworthiness, a program's financial integrity and patients' safety may be
compromised. Just as one of the best ways to keep thieves out of one's home is to
lock the front door, one of the best ways to keep dishonest providers out of a health
care program is to control entry into the program.
Gatekeeping has been a program challenge since the very beginning. 12
Historically, Medicare enrolled "any willing provider" in the interest of ensuring
access to care for beneficiaries.13 This orientation, stemming from a concern about
beneficiary access, created fraud and abuse vulnerabilities that were further
compounded by Medicare's mandate to make payments promptly.14 From an
integrity standpoint, this expedited turnaround in reimbursement complicates the
ability to stop or recover inappropriate payments, leading to a "pay and chase" 5
enforcement environment and a greater likelihood that the government may not be
made whole for erroneous or fraudulent claims.
There are promising developments, however, in the effort to better police
enrollment and prevent unscrupulous entities and individuals masquerading as
legitimate health care providers from gaining entry to the program and billing for
unnecessary or phantom services. The Medicare program and law enforcement are
advancing access to "real time" and integrated data, and implementing more
sophisticated data analytics to prevent payment for illegitimate claims and to
identify suspected fraud more quickly.16 Medicare is suspending payments to
responsive to changes in the marketplace; assisting the regulated community in adopting practices that
promote compliance with program requirements; vigilantly monitoring programs for evidence of fraud,
waste, and abuse; and swiftly responding to detected problems. See, e.g., Cutting Waste, Fraud,and
Abuse in Medicare and Medicaid: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health Before the H. Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, 11Ith Cong. 3 (2010) (statement of Daniel R. Levinson, Inspector Gen., Office
of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.).
12. See generally A Perspective on Fraud,Waste, and Abuse Within the Medicare and Medicaid
Programs: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform,
112th Cong. 7 (2011) (statement by Gerald T. Roy, Deputy Inspector Gen. for Investigations, Office of
Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.) ("The Department has faced challenges in
ensuring the integrity of the program's provider and supplier enrollment processes."). See also OFFICE
INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SOUTH FLORIDA SUPPLIERS' COMPLIANCE
WITH MEDICARE STANDARDS: RESULTS FROM UNANNOUNCED VISITS 3, 4, 10 (2007) (identifying

vulnerabilities in the DMEPOS supplier enrollment process and providing recommendations for
strengthening the system).
13. See generally A Perspective on Fraud, Waste, and Abuse Within the Medicare and Medicaid
Programs,supra note 12, at 7 (statement of Gerald T. Roy) ("Since its inception, Medicare has been a
program that allows 'any willing provider' to provide services for beneficiaries.").
14. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395h(c), 1395u(c) (2010) (establishing payment requirements).
15. "Pay and chase," as used in this essay, refers to reliance on after-the-fact enforcement to recoup
improperly claimed or stolen funds.
16. See generally HarnessingTechnology and Innovation to Cut Waste and Curb Fraudin Federal
Health Programs:HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Fed. Fin. Mgmt., Gov't Info., Fed. Servs., and Int l
Sec., S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov't Affairs, 12th Cong. (2011) (statement of Lewis Morris,
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providers suspected of fraud and using pre-payment review to help move from "pay
and chase" to prevention.17 OIG and Federal and State investigators and
prosecutors launched a Strike Force in South Florida in 2007 to pursue durable
medical equipment suppliers and infusion clinics suspected of Medicare fraud
using new techniques.' 8 The Strike Force Model was expanded in 2009 under a
national initiative, the Health Care Fraud Prevention and Enforcement Action Team
("HEAT") initiative.' 9 Working in nine metropolitan areaS20 across the nation, from
Brooklyn to Los Angeles, the Medicare Fraud Strike Force teams have charged
more than 1150 defendants who collectively billed the Medicare program more
than $2.9 billion. 21 Many of the targets of the original Strike Forces were sham
22
providers that enrolled not to provide services, but solely to scam the system.
Strike Force and other law enforcement work demonstrate the need for better
upfront prevention by the Medicare program. The effort to ensure that only
legitimate providers can bill Medicare was bolstered by Title VI of the Affordable
Care Act, which authorized additional funding for anti-fraud activities and
strengthened Medicare's pre-enrollment systems to better identify providers that
either do not meet Medicare standards or present a heightened risk of fraud.
Chief Counsel, Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.), available at
http://oig.hhs.gov/testimony/docs/20 11/morris testimony_07122011 .pdf (describing government uses of
technology to address program integrity); Reducing Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Medicare: Hearing
Before the Subcomms. on Health & Oversight and the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 11Ith Cong. 4
(2010) (statement by Lewis Morris, Chief Counsel, Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Health &
Human Servs.), http://oig.hhs.gov/testimony/docs/2010/morris-testimony614l0.pdf.
17. See Preventing Health Care Fraud: New Tools and Approaches to Combat Old Challenges:
HearingBefore the S. Comm. on Fin., 112th Cong. 6 (2011) (statement of Daniel R. Levinson, Inspector
Gen., Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.), available at
http://oig.hhs.gov/testimony/docs/2011/levinsontestimony_03022011 .pdf.
18. See Improving Efforts to Combat Health Care Fraud: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight, H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 112th Cong. 4 (2011) (statement of Lewis Morris, Chief
Counsel, Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.), available at
http://oig.hhs.gov/testimony/docs/201 1/morris testimony_03022011 .pdf.
19. HEAT was launched by HHS Secretary Kathleen Sebelius and Attorney General Eric Holder in
May 2009 with the goal of increasing cooperation between HHS and DOJ in combating health care
fraud. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Attorney General Holder and HHS
Secretary Sebelius Announce New Interagency Health Care Fraud Prevention and Enforcement Action
Team (May 20, 2009), http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2009pres/05/20090520a; HEAT Task Force
Success: Health Care Fraud Prevention and Enforcement Action Team (HEAT),
STOPMEDICAREFRAUD.Gov, http://stopmedicarefraud.gov/heattaskforce/index.html (last visited March
20, 2012).
20. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. & DEP'T OF JUSTICE, HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND
ABUSE CONTROL PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011 10-11 (2012) [hereinafter 2011
ANNUAL REPORT]. Strike Forces are concentrated in geographic locations identified as prevalent for
Medicare fraud. See, e.g., A Perspective on Fraud,Waste, and Abuse Within the Medicare andMedicaid
Programs,supra note 12, at 10 (statement of Gerald T. Roy).
21. See 2011 ANNUAL REPORT, supranote 20, at 11.
22. See, e.g., A Perspective on Fraud, Waste, and Abuse Within the Medicare and Medicaid
Programs,supra note 12, at 3-4 (statement of Gerald T. Roy) (describing ways in which health care
providers scam Medicare and Medicaid).
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Continuing the promising movement away from a "pay and chase"
environment requires attention to gatekeeping in new Medicare programs. This
may entail using methods other than the ordinary enrollment processes in order to
evaluate new entities, such as coordinated care entities, that may not be enrolling as
traditional providers. For example, in the SSP regulations, CMS identified program
integrity history among characteristics to be considered in evaluating program
applicants. 23 Such measures can help provide the government and the public with
greater confidence that participating providers and other entities are trustworthy.
II. SOUND PAYMENT
Sound payment policy and practices are essential to protecting the Federal
fisc.24 Three aspects are of particular importance: design, implementation, and
monitoring. Payment models must be designed to achieve intended outcomes,
payment rates and amounts must be established correctly, and the actual payments
made must be examined to ensure that they are proper. Past OIG experience
examining Medicare program payments has identified challenges in these areas. 25
Misalignment is one such challenge and can result from a variety of factors. For
example, misalignments can arise when a payment design is not updated to reflect
changes in medical or business practices or program goals. 26 Payment design can

23. Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,802,
67,981 (Nov. 2, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 425.304(b)).
24. Based on actuarial projections from the Office of the Actuary for CMS, in FY2012, government
health care spending is projected to be approximately forty-six percent of national health spending, and
the Federal government is expected to cover approximately sixty-one percent of that amount. See
OFFICE OF THE ACTUARY, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., NATIONAL HEALTH
EXPENDITURE PROJECTIONS 2011-2021 22, available at http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-

and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/Downloads/Proj201 IPDF.pdf.
By FY202 1, government health care spending is projected to grow to approximately fifty percent of the
national amount, and the Federal government portion will grow too, up to approximately two-thirds of
total government health spending. Id; Sean P. Keehan et al., NationalHealth Expenditure Projections:
Modest Annual Growth Until Coverage Expands and Economic Growth Accelerates, 31 HEALTH AFF.
(forthcoming 2012), available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/contentlearly/2012/06/1l/hithaff.2012.
0404.full. Sound payment policies and practices also protect beneficiaries, who often pay a portion of
the bill for many services. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395e (2006) (Medicare Part A deductibles and
coinsurance).
25. See generally OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., FY 2010 TOP MANAGEMENT AND PERFORMANCE
CHALLENGES IDENTIFIED BY OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 111-4 through 10 (2010) (describing some

of the challenges and approaches taken to address them).
26. OIG's work examining Medicare payment for global surgery fees is instructive on this point.
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., A-05-07-00077, NATIONWIDE
REVIEW OF EVALUATION AND MANAGEMENT SERVICES INCLUDED IN EYE AND OCULAR ADNEXA
GLOBAL
SURGERY
FEES
FOR
CALENDAR
YEAR
2005
1
(2009),
available at

http://oig.hhs.gov/oas/reports/region5/50700077.pdf Medicare bundles payments for certain
and associated services into "global surgery fees." Id. However, medical practice has evolved
global fees were designed. Id. at 3-4. In the case of eye surgeries, for example, physicians
provide fewer services than is assumed in the payment model. Id. at 3. OIG determined that
rates have not been adjusted accordingly, resulting in payment inefficiencies. Id at 5.

surgeries
since the
typically
payment
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also impact how care is delivered. The effects of payment structures on practice
should be monitored to guard against unintended consequences for quality or cost.
Appropriate safeguards and monitoring are important to ensure that intended
payment efficiencies are realized, quality of care goals are achieved, and
expenditures are proper.
Experience also teaches that payment structures can create incentives for
misconduct that are attractive to unscrupulous providers. For example, fee-forservice payment systems can reward increased utilization, raising the risk of
overutilization and payment for unnecessary services. Capitated payments, on the
other hand, tend to reduce that risk but potentially incentivize inappropriate
underutilization. Thus, understanding the applicable payment structure-including
the way Federal funds flow and the financial incentives that are created-is
fundamental to identifying and safeguarding against potential fraud and abuse.
Sound payment policy and practices take on added dimensions in the context
of coordinated health care models. Accuracy of payments is particularly critical as
payments become more complex and include additional variables around quality
and performance. As to payment design, it is imperative that the program monitor
medical practice and utilization changes and adjust payment designs accordingly to
maintain incentives for quality and efficiency. Program officials will need to be
sensitive to, and take steps to prevent, potential unintended impacts on utilization
and patient care arising from payment design. 27 As to implementation, the
Medicare program needs to set payments based on sound assumptions and accurate
data, updating assumptions and payment rates accordingly. Finally, the program
must ensure that providers submit accurate data and information for payment
calculations in order to calculate payments and to test the accuracy of actual
payments made.
III. PROVIDER COMPLIANCE

Making significant changes in a program like Medicare requires that those
involved in the change initiatives become partners, not just participants. Provider
engagement in meaningful self-policing is essential to ensuring program integrity.
Effective compliance programs help honest providers partner with government to
tackle fraud, waste, and abuse. They also help providers improve their business
operations and better manage business and legal risk. OIG has long assisted various

27. OIG work addressing drug prices offers a cautionary example. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN.,
DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OEI-03-07-00440, BENEFICIARY UTILIZATION OF ALBUTEROL
AND LEVALBUTEROL UNDER MEDICARE PART B 1-2, 13, 18 (2009) (studying utilization rates of two
similar asthma drugs). For this report, OIG studied Medicare Part B payments for two similar inhalation
drugs used to treat the same indications. Id. at 1. One drug was significantly more expensive than the
other. See id. at 1-2. OIG found that shifts in utilization patterns for the drugs coincided with changes in
Medicare payment and coding. Id. at 13. Utilization of the more expensive drug increased when
Medicare reimbursement for that drug was more favorable to suppliers; utilization shifted dramatically
toward the less expensive drug when Medicare changed its pricing structure. Id.
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sectors of the health care industry in adopting practices that promote voluntary
compliance through guidance and training resources. 28 Congress' mandate in the
Affordable Care Act that Medicare and Medicaid providers adopt compliance plans
underscored the importance of provider compliance efforts. 29 The elements of an
effective compliance program were first articulated in the sentencing guidelines for
corporate violations in 199130 and are reflected in OIG's compliance resources. 3 '
These elements include: written policies and procedures, compliance professionals,
effective training, effective communication, internal monitoring, enforcement of
standards, and prompt response to problems and violations. 32
A compliance program will only be successful if it is supported by a corporate
culture committed to compliance and the aims of efficiency, economy, and
effectiveness. 33 The governance and leadership of coordinated care organizations
will play a vital role in fostering an accountable corporate culture.
Good governance and compliance must not only be directed at business
operations and "bottom-line" returns, but must also focus on the quality of care and
compliance with program rules. Provider compliance over the past two decades has
tended to focus on business operations and regulatory compliance. In the new
health care landscape, clinical care and quality will grow as compliance
considerations. 34 Additional features of redesigned care coordination models, such
as transparency and broad use of health information technology,35 should assist in
the development and operation of effective internal controls.

28. See Compliance, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., http://oig.hhs.gov/compliance (last visited June 8,
2012) (providing links to OIG's compliance resources including compliance program guidance, advisory
opinions, special fraud alerts and bulletins, training videos, and other resources).
29. Affordable Care Act, §§ 6401(a)(3),(b)(1), 6102 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395cc(j)(8),
1396a(a)(77), 1320a-7j (Supp. 2011) (new requirements for providers in Medicare Parts A and B and
Medicaid). Since 2003, Medicare Part D plan sponsors have been required to "adopt and implement an
effective compliance program." 42 C.F.R. § 423.504(b)(4)(vi) (2011).
30. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1 (2011); see also Paula Desio, An
Overview of the Organizational Guidelines, U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, http://www.ussc.gov/
guidelines/Organizational_Guidelines/ORGOVERVIEW.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2012) (outlining the
basic tenets of the guidelines).
31. See, e.g., OIG Supplemental Compliance Program Guidance for Hospitals, 70 Fed. Reg. 4,858,
4,874-76 (Jan. 31, 2005).
32. Id.
33. For example, CMS recognized the importance of provider compliance in the SSP regulations by
requiring ACOs to adopt compliance plans; to promote efficient compliance operations, the regulations
permit coordination among the existing compliance operations of an ACO's providers. See Medicare
Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,802, 67,980 (Nov. 2, 2011)
(to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 425.300).
34. See generally Highlights of the Keynote Address Delivered by Daniel Levinson, Inspector
General of the Department of Health & Human Services, at the Health Care Compliance Association
Annual Compliance Institute April 19, 2010, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN.,
http://oig.hhs.gov/testimony/docs/201 0/hccaigkeynotesummary.pdf.
35. See BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., TASK FORCE ON DELIVERY Sys. REFORM & HEALTH IT,
DELIVERY SYSTEM REFORM AND THE ROLE OF HEALTH IT: AN INTERIM REPORT 5 (2011) ("[D]elivery
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IV. MONITORING

Vigilantly monitoring for evidence of fraud, waste, and abuse is vital to
protecting programs and patients. Technology, data, and advanced data analytics
are essential tools to identify, track, and monitor billing patterns, utilization rates,
and other indicia of potential problems. Rapid advances in capabilities and
adoption of health information technology, as well as greater transparency, promise
to aid in this critical function. 36 OIG and its government partners are engaged in
enhancing monitoring capabilities through data systems designed to furnish a
global picture of the Medicare environment and to support data analysis to quickly
spot patterns of potentially troublesome claims and billing, including indications of
clinical incoherence.37 Data are also increasingly available from multiple program
areas and data sources. 38 This more robust data environment enables the
government to consider a wider range of data points-including geographic
indicators, compromised billing numbers, and other pertinent data points-that
inform an analysis of program integrity.
Focusing on claims is just one part of an effective monitoring approach,
however. The government must also monitor quality of care and health care
provider performance. Advances in technology and science will facilitate this
effort. 39 Heightened attention to quality and performance is particularly critical in
the context of coordinated care initiatives that reward participants for achieving
quality, performance, and cost targets. The government must monitor to ensure that
participants achieve those targets by improving care and appropriately reducing
costs, not by gaming the system through improper methods such as avoiding
expensive or difficult patients. 40 It is also incumbent on the participants themselves
to monitor their operations. Important data for quality and performance

system reforms that promote coordinated, accountable, patient-centered care cannot be attained without
the support of an effective health [information technology] infrastructure.").
36. See generally Harnessing Technology and Innovation to Cut Waste and Curb Fraudin Federal
Health Programs:Hearing Befbre the Subcomm. on Fed. Fin. Mgmt., Gov t Info., Fed Servs., and Int'1
Sec., Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov 't AJJirs, supra note 16 (statement of Lewis Morris).
Regrettably, health information technology can also aid the unscrupulous in committing fraud. Id. at 7-8.
37. See, e.g., 2011 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 20 (discussing government methods to prevent
waste, fraud, and abuse).
38. See generally Harnessing Technology and Innovation to Cute Waste and Curb Fraud in
FederalHealth Programs,supra note 36 (statement of Lewis Morris).
39. See, e.g., DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REPORT TO CONGRESS: NATIONAL STRATEGY
FOR QUALITY IMPROVEMENT IN HEALTH CARE 12 (2011) (describing health information technology

initiatives).
40. See, e.g., Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg.
67,802, 67,973-82. The SSP calls for ACOs to be monitored for avoidance of at-risk beneficiaries and
terminated for such conduct. Id. (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 425.316).
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measurement are increasingly available to providers in a timely manner that
facilitates better care and improved efficiency. 41
Effective monitoring involves an evaluation of the potential risks, including
any behavioral incentives created by payment structures, and calibration of the
monitoring plan. The government must monitor the right areas in the right way. An
example of the importance of carefully evaluating the risks and calibrating the
monitoring strategy can be seen in the context of the SSP payment construct. Under
the SSP, Medicare pays ACOs and their participating providers in two ways: first,
providers are paid on an ordinary fee-for-service basis for the items and services
they provide to beneficiaries; second, qualifying ACOs are paid a share of the cost
savings they achieve each year. 42 This hybrid system involves the pairing of
volume-based fee-for-service payments and shared savings payments. In these
circumstances, an effective monitoring strategy must include robust monitoring for
the range of potential risks inherent in both types of payments, including
overutilization and underutilization. Effective monitoring, particularly early in a
new program, will inform additional oversight efforts. For example, it will identify
undesirable conduct so that the government may take prompt remedial action.
V. GOVERNMENT REMEDIATION

Although preventing all fraud, waste, and abuse is the goal of oversight, there
will never be perfect prevention. When fraud, waste, or abuse is detected, it is
important for the government to respond swiftly to remediate the problem. 43 This
effort often requires coordination among government partners to tailor an

41. See, e.g., DATA.MEDICARE.GOV, http://data.medicare.gov (last visited June 8, 2012) (providing
datasets, lists of contacts, and links regarding Medicare data); HOSPITAL COMPARE,
http://www.hospitalcompare.hhs.gov (last visited June 8, 2012) (providing comparable data on
hospitals).
42. Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,802,
67,973, 67,986 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. §§ 425.604, 425.606). Some ACOs will also assume
downside risk for certain losses. Id. (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 425.600).
43. It is estimated that approximately three to as much as ten percent of all health care expenditures
are attributable to fraud. See CLIFF BINDER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL43127, MEDICARE PROGRAM
INTEGRITY: ACTIVITIES TO PROTECT MEDICARE FROM PAYMENT ERRORS, FRAUD, AND ABUSE 9 (2011)

("Fraud analysts and law enforcement officials estimate that between three percent and ten percent of
total health care expenditures (for all payers, including Medicare) are lost annually to fraud."); FBI,
FINANCIAL
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REPORT
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http://www.fbi.gov/publications/financial/fcs_report2008/financial
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(2008),

NAT' L

HEALTH CARE ANTI-FRAUD ASS'N, FIGHTING HEALTH CARE FRAUD: AN INTEGRAL PART OF HEALTH
CARE REFORM 3 (2009); ROUNDTABLE ON VALUE & SCIENCE-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE, INSTITUTE OF
MEDICINE, Synopsis and Overview, in THE HEALTHCARE IMPERATIVE: LOWERING COSTS AND

IMPROVING OUTCOMES 53 (Pierre L. Yong ed., 2011) ("Additional areas suggested for consideration
both in terms of targets and strategies included the issues such as costs of fraud and abuse, which has
been estimated to cost 3 to 10 percent of total health spending. . . ."). Waste in health care represents a
larger expenditure. Cf David Lawrence, Bridging the Quality Chasm, in BUILDING ABETTER DELIVERY
SYSTEM 99, 99 (Proctor P. Reid et al. eds., 2005) ("Between $.30 and $.40 of every dollar spent on
health care is spent on the costs of poor quality.").

2012]

A NEW ERA OF MEDICARE OVERSIGHT

259

appropriate response. Responses can range from criminal or civil enforcement to
administrative action, resolution of matters self-disclosed by providers, 44 or agency
redesign of a program, process, or payment policy.
OIG has worked closely with its program and law enforcement partners to
coordinate government remediation that is appropriate to the particular problem or
concern. As earlier noted, it has done so, for example, through the HEAT Strike
Forces designed primarily to attack criminal conduct concentrated in certain
geographic areas around the nation, and through other initiatives that draw on
investigative, prosecutorial, audit, and evaluative expertise to redress fraud and
abuse. The spirit of cross-government cooperation has manifested itself in
initiatives to streamline and consolidate data sources and work across portfolios to
address issues holistically.
A sustained government commitment to respond to fraud, waste, and abuse
will be critical in the twenty-first century health care environment. This response
must be flexible and adaptable to emerging risks and program changes. Program
integrity, including strong enforcement, must be a core value ingrained in the
administration of coordinated care and other new payment and delivery models.
The SSP provides an interesting example of tailored approaches to oversight.
The SSP introduced into the Medicare program ACOs designed to achieve better
care and lower costs by moving from fragmented to coordinated care across
providers. 45 To build ACOs, providers must come together in ways that, in some
circumstances, implicate fraud and abuse laws addressing financial arrangements
between and among prospective referral sources, such as hospitals and physicians. 46
These laws include the Federal anti-kickback statute, 47 the Physician Self-Referral
Law, 48 and the Civil Monetary Penalties Law. 49 Among other things, these statutes

44. Providers may voluntarily disclose and resolve self-identified violations through OIG's and
CMS's self-disclosure protocols. See Publication of OIG's Provider Self-Disclosure Protocol, 63 Fed.
Reg. 58,399, 58,400 (Oct. 30, 1998) (setting forth OIG's voluntary provider self-disclosure protocol);
Self-Referral Disclosure Protocol, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP'T HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVS. (last visited June 8, 2012), https://www.cms.gov/PhysicianSelfReferral/98_
Self ReferralDisclosureProtocol.asp (CMS's physician self-referral protocol).
45. Under the SSP, groups of providers, such as physicians and hospitals, form ACOs and work
together to manage and coordinate care for Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries. Affordable Care Act,
§ 3022 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(a)(1)(A)). Those that meet quality and performance
standards are qualified to receive, in addition to their customary reimbursement, a share of the savings
they generate for the Medicare program. Affordable Care Act, § 3022 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §
1395jjj(a)(1)(B)).
46. See, e.g., Final Waivers in Connection with the Shared Savings Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,992,
67,993 (Nov. 2, 2011).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2006).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2006).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a (2006). Particularly relevant to the SSP are two provisions of the Civil
Monetary Penalties law: the prohibition on hospital payments to physicians to reduce or limit services
and the prohibition on beneficiary inducements. Id. §§ 1320a-7a(a)(5), (b)(1)-(2).
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and corresponding regulations50 set parameters for permissible financial
relationships between referring parties. 5' Providers expressed concern that the
constraints of these fraud and abuse laws would chill innovative business
arrangements needed for ACOs to succeed. 52 For the SSP, Congress gave the
Secretary of HHS authority to waive these laws "as necessary" to carry out the
program. 53 However, nothing in the statute evidences any congressional intent to
sanction the proliferation of the underlying harms addressed by these laws, such as
overutilization, increased costs to Medicare, inappropriate patient steering, and
stinting on care.
In promulgating the regulations that established waivers under this authority,
CMS and OIG articulated the goal as "provid[ing] ACOs with flexibility, certainty,
and latitude for beneficial innovation and variation in connection with the new
[SSP], while also protecting Medicare beneficiaries and the Medicare program
from fraud and abuse." 54 To strike this balance, the SSP regulations and waiver
regulations together included a comprehensive set of protections to safeguard the
program and beneficiaries.55 These protections included requirements that ACOs

50. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952 (2011) (safe harbor regulations under the Federal anti-kickback statute);
42 C.F.R. § 411.350 et seq. (Physician Self-Referral Law regulations).
51. See, e.g., Final Waivers in Connection with the Shared Savings Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,992,
67,994-95 (describing legal authorities).
52. See, e.g., id. ("[S]takeholders have expressed concern that the restrictions these laws place on
certain arrangements between physicians, hospitals, and other individuals and entities may impede
development of some of the innovative integrated-care models envisioned by the Shared Savings
Program."). Stakeholders have also expressed similar concerns regarding the application of the fraud
and abuse laws to integrated and coordinated care arrangements outside the context of the SSP. See, e.g,
id. at 67,999 (summary of public comments on the need for waivers outside the SSP).
53. Affordable Care Act, § 3022(f) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(f) (2010)). Congress has
addressed waivers of fraud and abuse laws elsewhere in connection with certain new Medicare and
Medicaid payment and delivery models, including at section 5007 of the Deficit Reduction Act in
connection with a specific gainsharing demonstration program (42 U.S.C. § 1395 note), and in other
sections of the Affordable Care Act. See, e.g., Affordable Care Act, §§ 3026, 3023 (current version at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1315a(d)(1), 1395cc-5(e)(6)).
54. Final Waivers in Connection With the Shared Savings Program, 765 Fed. Reg. 67,992, 68,003.
The waiver regulations, jointly issued by CMS and OIG, set forth five waivers available to ACOs that
precisely meet specific waiver conditions. Id. at 67,999-68,001. The waivers address a spectrum of
ACO arrangements from start-up arrangements to distributions of shared savings payments to certain
incentives offered to patients to engage them in promoting their own health. Id. While most public
respondents supported the waivers, some constituencies, private insurers among them, expressed
reservations. See id at 67,996, 67,998 (summarizing views of commenters). The waiver regulations
were issued as part of an unprecedented suite of concurrent multi-agency guidance. See Accountable
Care Organizations, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
(last visited Feb. 29, 2012)
http://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/accountable-care-organizations/index.asp
(providing links to guidance from multiple Federal Agencies). In addition to the programmatic
regulations issued by CMS and the waiver regulations, the antitrust agencies (the Federal Trade
Commission and the Department of Justice Antitrust Division) and the Internal Revenue Service issued
policy guidance related to the SSP. See id.
55. See Final Waivers in Connection with the Shared Savings Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,992,
68,003 (Nov. 2, 2011). As noted in the preamble to the regulations:
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operate in an accountable and transparent manner, as well as tools to allow the
government to detect problems through rigorous monitoring of ACO operations
and performance. 56 The government retained authorities to redress identified
problems, including enforcement authorities that were not waived and
administrative tools, such as program termination, corrective action plans, payment
denials, and others.57 The SSP waiver design was premised on an expectation that
provider accountability and program integrity requirements embedded into the SSP
and the waivers would mitigate the risk of harm in the first instance, and that
residual risk could be remediated through appropriate government action.
VI. CONCLUSION
As the SSP example suggests, oversight in the changing health care
environment will need to be comprehensive and flexible, with robust tools to
prevent, detect, and remedy instances of fraud, waste, and abuse. The outcomes of
the SSP and other nascent initiatives are unknown. The SSP represents one
experiment among many in the evolving health care system of the twenty-first
century. As new programs develop and results become known, thoughtful
evaluation of program outcomes and the utility of oversight strategies will be
necessary. The government will need to adapt its approach to address detected
vulnerabilities.
[W]aivers rely, as a threshold matter, on the programmatic requirements of the Shared
Savings Program to safeguard Medicare beneficiaries and the Medicare program. The
design of the waivers is premised on our expectation that risks of fraud and abuse,
such as overutilization, inappropriate utilization, and underutilization, will be
mitigated, in the first instance, by the Shared Savings Program design, including, for
example, the eligibility requirements, the quality of care and accountability provisions,
and the program integrity provisions. In these waivers, we are adding additional
safeguards in the form of governance responsibility, transparency, and a documented
audit trail.
Id. The program rules set out these protections in detail. See Medicare Shared Savings Program:
Accountable Care Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,802 (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 425).
56. See sources cited supra note 55.
57. See Final Waivers in Connection With the Shared Savings Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,992,
68,007-08. (stating that the government has a variety of tools to address fraud or other problems). As the
preamble to the waiver regulations states:
The government's enforcement experience reflects that, to varying degrees, all Federal
health care programs are susceptible to fraud and abuse. These waivers should not be
read to reflect any diminution of our commitment to protect programs and
beneficiaries from harms associated with kickbacks and referral payments, including
overutilization, increased costs, and substandard or poor quality care. DHHS will
monitor ACOs and the Shared Savings Program as a whole for fraud or abuse, such as
billing for medically unnecessary or upcoded services, submitting false or fraudulent
data, or providing worthless or substandard care. If these or other problematic
practices are found, the government has a number of tools to address the problem. In
appropriate cases, we will use these tools to protect the interests of beneficiaries and
the Medicare program.
Id.
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A new era is emerging, and not only for Medicare. New payment and delivery
models involving coordinated care exist around the nation. Many private health
insurers are contracting with provider groups to create models designed for patientcentered care, population health, and integrated provider service delivery. States are
also exploring these models. The development, implementation, and application of
coordinated and integrated health care models in an environment of accountability
and transparency are viewed as crucial correctives in restoring greater financial and
professional integrity.58
As Medicare adjusts to the new landscape, it will be critical for program
officials and providers to place a sharp focus on ensuring accountability and
transparency in the design and operation of these new programs. Providers must
exercise sound judgment in creating robust governance structures equal to the task
of making these new systems work as intended. Government and industry must
demonstrate that new coordinated care delivery and payment models do what they
promise, thereby rewarding successful industry participants, protecting the health
of beneficiaries, and saving taxpayers from unnecessary public expense.
This is plainly a global responsibility, as effective oversight across health care
models will require holistic and integrated approaches. All stakeholders must do
their part, and with a joint and collective effort to ensure proper gatekeeping, sound
payment, compliance, monitoring, and government remediation, Medicare and all
who depend on it can look forward to a healthier and more secure future.

58. See CTR. FOR THE EVALUATIVE CLINICAL SERVS., DARTMOUTH ATLAS PROJECT, THE CARE OF
PATIENTS WITH SEVERE CHRONIC ILLNESS: A REPORT ON THE MEDICARE PROGRAM, EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY 1, 4 (2006) (positing that transparency and integration will improve accountability and
efficiency). As budgets tighten and policymakers seek new savings opportunities, tackling the problem
of waste and inefficiency in the health care system will assume growing importance. See Lawrence,
supra note 43, at 99 (noting that "[a] vast amount of money is wasted on overuse, underuse, misuse,
duplication, system failures, unnecessary repetition, poor communication, and inefficiency"); CTR. FOR
THE EVALUATIVE CLINICAL SERVS., supra; MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM'N, REPORT TO THE
CONGRESS: REGIONAL VARIATION IN MEDICARE SERVICE USE 22 (2011). The greatest portion of

estimated waste is attributable to inefficiencies; uneconomic practices; and ineffectiveness. Cf
Lawrence, supra note 43, at 99. Coordinated care, evidence-based medicine, and value based payment
models offer promising opportunities for improved efficiency. In the future, advances in precision
medicine may enhance the ability to ensure that high quality care is provided in a cost effective manner.

